At the Atlantic, Israel Policy Forum’s Michael Koplow (who used to write the excellent blog Ottomans and Zionists) outlines the multiple factors made Israel’s attack on Iran possible, including Israel’s newfound isolation after flattening most of Gaza, Trump 2.0’s weird foreign footing, and Netanyahu’s domestic political struggles:
For years, Israel has been worried that a regional war would lead to isolation, crumbling relationships with its Arab neighbors, and European opprobrium. Israel’s campaign against Hamas and the resulting destruction in Gaza have created diplomatic challenges that once seemed unthinkable: The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Israel’s prime minister and former defense minister, multiple government ministers are under personal sanctions from Europe and Canada, accusations that Israel is committing genocide are routine, and the regional normalization process has ground to a complete halt. Many Israelis have treated much of this with a shrug and moved on, embracing the adage that the fear of death is often worse than death itself. Israeli leaders have found all of this less consequential than they anticipated, and that makes their concerns about diplomatic isolation from an extended conflict with Iran less acute.
And then President Donald Trump’s distinctive foreign-policy approach created an environment in which Israel had more leeway to strike Iran but was also more likely to have to do it alone. Trump has been clear about his reticence to have more American military involvement in the Middle East—and since Israeli strikes have begun, he has rushed to clarify that the U.S. did not participate—but was also not going to hold Israel back if it was willing to proceed and accept the risks involved. Past U.S. administrations had withheld a green light from Israel, but had also intimated that they would be willing to deal with the threat of Iranian nuclear breakout if it became advanced enough. Trump’s preference for avoiding military conflicts and his pursuit of a deal with Iran counterintuitively created a greater incentive for Israel to take action, because the U.S. was neither going to stop Israel from attacking nor necessarily stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Finally, for much of his tenure, Netanyahu has been Israel’s most cautious prime minister when it comes to employing military force. But the aftermath of October 7, his criminal indictments and ongoing trial, and the deep unpopularity of his coalition have together led Netanyahu to throw all caution to the wind. His poll numbers are deeply underwater and have been since he first pursued his proposed judicial overhaul more than two years ago. The unpopularity of the war in Gaza, the sense that he has abandoned the remaining hostages held by Hamas in order to placate his far-right partners, his refusal to take any responsibility for October 7, and his capitulation to the Haredi parties on dodging military service so he can keep his government afloat have left him in a deep political hole. In such an environment, rolling the dice on an Iran strike—the only move left to him that will be popular across the Israeli political spectrum—might salvage his poll numbers at a time when he has little left to lose, and give him the boost he needs to call a snap election and remain in office.
